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## REVIEWS.

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*Naturalism and Agnosticism.* (The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the years 1896-8.)  
By JAMES WARD, Sc.D., Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic in the University of Cambridge. 2 vols. The Macmillan Co.

IN these days the teleological and sociological conceptions are having their innings in the interpretation of experience; and their last and one of their strongest is to be found in Professor Ward's lectures. The first statement of the preface is: "These lectures do not form a systematic treatise. They only attempt to discuss in a popular way certain assumptions of 'modern science' which have led to a widespread, but more or less tacit, rejection of idealistic views of the world." The preface says also: "I take it for granted that till an idealistic (*i. e.*, spiritualistic) view of the world can be sustained, any exposition of theism is but wasted labor." While such statements tend to place the writer somewhat in the attitude of an apologist, and perhaps help to account for what will appear to some an undue polemical spirit in certain passages, they do not, of course, affect the inherent weight of the argument. The limits of this notice will permit mention of only a few central points—especially of those more likely to be of some interest to readers of this JOURNAL.

Vol. I is occupied with a detailed account of the difficulties encountered in the attempt to state experience in terms of matter and motion. The conclusion is that the "mechanical theory" is valuable as a descriptive formula of one aspect of experience only—the quantitative one; but utterly inadequate for a description of experience as a whole, since all experience cannot be reduced to quantitative terms. Perhaps the best parts of this volume are the discussions of the conceptions of matter—motion, space, time, mass, energy, and force—rather than the long cross—sometimes very cross—examinations of Mr. Huxley and Mr. Spencer.

In Vol. II, after a thoroughgoing criticism of psycho-physical parallelism as an attempt to escape the difficulties of the mechanical

theory, the "previous question" is put in asking how this dualism of the physical and the psychical, which goes to pieces so readily under criticism, ever came about, and what is the significance of its conceptions. The finding is that this dualism does not originate in the individual's perceptual experience of an "external world," but that it is of essentially social origin. "The researches of anthropologists warrant us in assuming that when human intercourse begins there is no dualism."<sup>1</sup> Dualism comes about in this wise: When L, M, and N look at one object, *e. g.*, the sun, each has his own individual object. "How do they come to know that the actual object of each is the same individual object for all?" The answer is through some common reaction. All point or reach or in some manner react in the same way. This common reaction is at the same time inter-communication, and advances from gesture through exclamation to systematic language. Through this common reaction and inter-communication it is found that there is a common or "transsubjective" object independent of L, M, and N severally. Here, according to Mr. Ward, occurs the first step leading to dualism. Finding the transsubjective object independent of L, M, and N *severally*, it is concluded that it is independent of them *collectively*. To this fallacy is added another, which the author calls the fallacy of "introjection," and which occurs as follows:

Of my fellow common thought and language lead me to assume, not merely that his experience is distinct from mine, but that it is *in* him in the form of sensations, perceptions, and other internal states. . . . Thus, while my environment is an external world for me, his experience is for me an internal world in him. And since I apply this conception to all my fellows and it is applied by all my fellow-men to me, I naturally apply it also to myself. Thus, instead of construing others' experience exactly and precisely on the lines of our own — the duality of subject and object — we are induced to misconstrue our own experience on the lines of a false but highly plausible assumption as to others' experience, which actually contradicts our own. With this contradiction and the fallacy of naïve realism just referred to dualism is essentially complete.<sup>2</sup>

Coming to the more distinctively constructive part of the lectures, Mr. Ward finds that the fundamental characteristic of experience is its subject-object form. This character is frankly accepted as given.

If this duality in unity of subject and object be indeed the fundamental fact of experience present alike in cognition, in feeling, and in volition, then,

<sup>1</sup> Vol. II, p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. II, p. 172.

so far at any rate, there can be nothing to explain. The demand for explanation may be taken as evidence that we have misconceived the facts.<sup>1</sup>

This disposition of the subject-object relation would seem scarcely to be expected from one who insists, as Mr. Ward does throughout both volumes, that the categorizing of experience is essentially a teleological affair. A little farther on, in treating the subject-object relation in individual experience, the object is found to be of a conative rather than of a cognitive nature.

Regarding experience in this wise as life, self-conservation, self-realization, and taking conation, not cognition, as its central feature, we must conclude that it is not that "content" of objects which the subject cannot alter, that gives them their place in its experience, but their worth, positive or negative, their goodness or badness, as ends or means to life.<sup>2</sup>

Were this conative nature of the object pursued farther, perhaps the subject-object character of experience would not appear quite so gratuitous. In other words, it seems there is not sufficient justification given for regarding the subject-object character of experience as on an entirely different plane from the psychical-physical. The latter is regarded as a differentiation *within* experience—as conceptions evolved in the development of experience as means to its further progress. In the treatment of the subject-object nature of experience, therefore, it appears that the author's teleology is not quite thorough-going. The same appears true of the individual-universal relation. It, too, appears to be given, and to be a differentiation *of* rather than *within* experience.

Noting this latter distinction a little more in detail, we find it is a further differentiation of experience in its subject-object form. Thus giving in the last analysis of experience four terms—the subject and object of individual experience, and the subject and object of universal experience—Mr. Ward discusses the relation of the two subjects to each other and of the two objects to each other, and finds there is perfect continuity between them. But along with this finding he appears also to hold that the universal form of experience has developed *out of* the individual. Thus<sup>3</sup> we find:

To refute the dualism of ordinary scientific thought, then, it is necessary to show that the generalized or universal experience with which it is immediately concerned has grown out of, depends upon, and is really but an extension of our primary *individual*, concrete experience.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vol. II, p. 129.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. II, p. 153.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. II, p. 184.

<sup>4</sup> Italics mine.

Were it proposed to show that the individual *and* universal develop *together*, as a polar differentiation, out of a "primary, concrete experience," it would certainly be more nearly in line with what one is led to expect up to this point in the lectures. On their face this and other similar passages look like the old isolated individualism of Hobbes. To be sure, farther on we find this: "Once again I say the subject of universal experience is not numerically distinct from the subject of individual experience;" and many affirmations of their "organic unity" are to be found. But this "oneness" and "organic unity" appears to exist *after* the universal has developed out of the individual, the individual having been prior to and apparently independent of the universal. No better refutation of such a conception of the individual as this involves could be found than many passages from the lectures themselves. But this only makes the discrepancy the more puzzling.

There appears to be plenty of room, too, for the development of further questions concerning the relation of "the four terms of experience;" *e. g.*, the relation of the universal subject to the individual object, and of the individual subjects to each other and as an "aggregate" to the universal subject. To say nothing of such questions as the relation of the universal subject to "sentience," etc. Such questions, however, reveal the merit rather than a demerit of the lectures. Everywhere they bristle with suggestions. Indeed, frequently the lecturer himself is drawn aside by "suggestions," often enough and far enough to endanger the unity of the lecture. The whole line of discussion running through both volumes, showing the necessity for a closer union between the natural and the philosophical sciences, by pointing out in detail how each breaks down going it alone, is both timely and masterly. Throughout the lectures the influence of Lotze is apparent, and is freely acknowledged. On the whole, Mr. Ward's lectures are likely to be regarded as the most important philosophical contribution since Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. And, owing to its more popular style, its larger use of scientific and sociological material, and its confessed theological interest, it is certain to have a much wider circle of readers than did Mr. Bradley's book. ADDISON W. MOORE.

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*Tropical Colonization.* By Alleyne Ireland. The Macmillan Co., 1899. Pp. xii + 282.

MR. IRELAND has lived a number of years in tropical countries, and has made a close study of institutions. His collection of books and